INTRODUCTION
The Harlem Community Justice Center (Justice Center) officially opened in July 2000 with all the fanfare of a major civic event. The Chief Judge of the State of New York, Judith Kaye, and the Mayor of the City of New York, Rudolph Guiliani, were keynote speakers, lauding the combined efforts of private administrators and public officials in reopening a deteriorating but magnificent 1892 court building in the center of Harlem. The ceremony began and ended with gospel sung by the Addicts Rehabilitation Center Choir, a musical reflection of one component of the Justice Center's jurisdiction. The new Juvenile Intervention Court will focus on young people arrested for non-violent drug-related offenses or who are at risk of substance abuse. The Justice Center also contains a fledgling Youth Court, where teenagers trained as "judge, jury, and attorneys" judge their peers who have been charged with low-level offenses.' Before joining the Chief Judge and the Mayor in a ribbon-cutting ceremony, a Youth Court member addressed the assembled notables and community members, remarking on the positive impact the Youth Court had already had on her life. While the Justice Center will handle a significant proportion of local landlord-tenant court matters, its role as a component of the New York City Family Court raises some of the most confounding judicial reform issues.
The Justice Center describes its "Youth Justice" role as addressing "youth crime in East and Central Harlem. "2 To achieve this:
the Justice Center works intensively with young people who have engaged in delinquent behavior, providing them with the tools they need to get on the right track and avoid further offending. The Justice Center also engages in comprehensive * Edward Ross Aranow Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I would like to thank Christolette Hoey for research assistance, Michele Cortese and Jane Waldfogel for comments on earlier drafts, and Warren Scharf for his peerless editorial pen. This Article is dedicated to the memory of the two inspiring JRD Kays: Kathryn A. McDonald and Kay McNally. Jane Spinak can be reached at spinak@law. columbia.edu.
1. Youth Justice Fact Sheet, Harlem Community Justice Center (May 17, 2001 ) (on file with author).
2.
Id.
prevention activities, reaching out to at-risk-youths before they get into trouble with the law and providing them with the skills to make better life choices. 3 The Justice Center thus incorporates assessment services and the partial provision of treatment and preventive services as part of the court's responsibilities. The presiding judge assumes an active monitoring function, closely watching the youth's progress and relying on graduated sanctions to promote individual accountability. 4 Watching the Justice Center's opening ceremony in the brightly painted, light-filled, and airy central courtroom reminded me of another ceremony I witnessed two years earlier-the first "graduation" of mothers who had completed their participation in New York City's first Family Court Treatment Part (FCTP). The FCTP was the first "model part" introduced into Family Court in New York City.' As with the Justice Center, the FCTP shares some common features with other model Family Court parts being developed nationwide: an activist judge who helps to fashion, and then closely monitor, dispositions; a "team" of lawyers, social workers, and court personnel who try to identify and then work toward common goals with the family; and frequent and meaningful court appearances by relevant parties. 6 In the FCTP, parents accused of neglecting their children because of their substance abuse participate in an extensive court conferencing and monitoring system. 7 Parents eligible for the FCTP are assessed by the FCTP clinical staff, are required to waive their right to a litigated hearing, and must admit that the neglect was caused by their addiction. 8 The parent then enters into a negotiated treatment plan that has been created by the FCTP clinical staff, the parent and her counsel, the lawyer for the children, and the child protective agency's attorney and caseworker; the plan has also been approved by the presiding judge. 9 The parent is then referred immediately to treatment providers who have contracted with the court to have available treatment spaces.' 0 What ensues is an opportunities, and a sense of community endeavor (as opposed to solely individual triumph, though there is plenty of that). However, my own delight at both ceremonies was tempered by a darker vision of day-today reality in most Family Courts and by a substantial concern about whether "reform" or "model" courts created to address child welfare issues can produce systemic, lasting reform. This Article will explore that concern by reviewing current Family Court model court reform efforts in New York and nation-wide through a number of lenses.
Part I begins with a short description of Family Court, identifying some of the unique features of the court and considering some of the past and current efforts to reform the court by taking those features into account. This is followed by a proposal to analyze Family Court reform through a substantive rather than procedural lens, focusing on the value that families may derive from coming under the court's jurisdiction. Part II contains a description of current New York Family Court reform efforts in the context of the present conditions existing in these courts. Part III considers some preliminary information about the progress of model courts in New York and around the country. Finally, Part IV draws on the earlier discussion to recommend aspects of the model court reform movement that may have lasting, transformative potential for Family Court.
I. THE VALUE OF FAMILY COURT
Throughout its one hundred-year national history, the court variously called Juvenile Court, Domestic Court, Children's Court, or Family Court has struggled with defining its role and responsibilities.'2 This struggle is reflected in an assortment of overlapping ways. Although most states have created some type of Family Court as either a separate court or a division of a trial court, 2 ' the jurisdictional authority granted to these courts over family law issues varies considerably. New York's Family Court, for example, has original jurisdiction over some Rv. 469 (1998) . For purposes of this Article, I am using the broadest description of Family Court to include multiple areas of jurisdiction, such as that of New York, which includes delinquency, child welfare, child support, status offenses, family offenses, custody and visitation, guardianship, and adoption within its purview. My focus, however, is on child welfare proceedings.
21. Id. at 505-06. Barbara Babb has completed the most comprehensive review of the current state of Family Courts throughout the country.
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family issues, such as child protective and delinquency proceedings, 22 concurrent jurisdiction over others, such as custody and family offenses, 23 and no jurisdiction over divorce. 24 Such variations in jurisdictional authority continue to fuel the most persistent calls for Family Court reform, particularly the need for a unified Family Court system to integrate the court's response to all aspects of a family's needs when its members appear in court. 25 The arguments in support of this integration are fairly straightforward and reasonable: diminished jurisdictional and decisional conflicts, greater time and resource efficiencies for courts and litigants, and dedicated court personnel and judicial officers.' A unified Family Court system would expand the jurisdictional structure of the court that has existed, with only some variation, since its creation. Family Court in New York, for example, traditionally has had tripartite roles: the court dispenses "individualized" justice for the parties by using the substantial discretion given to the court by law and practice; the court draws on the "non-legal" resources in the medical and social service fields to inform and enhance its decision-making capacity; and the court's ultimate decision has at its core a remedial-or perhaps even preventive-purpose.27
A. Defining the Role of Family Court

THE TRADITIONAL QUERY
While there is near unanimity among Family Court observers that the advantages of some form of unified court are substantial, the breadth 22. N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTs LAW § 115 (a)(i), (vi) (McKinney 1998 27. Mary Jean McDonald, The Role and Responsibility of New York's Children's Court 2 (Jan. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). In dispensing "individualized justice," the court is also protecting the due process rights of the litigants before it. Id. Explains Gordon, " [a] dherence to objective standards at all stages does not show a lack of concern for persons coming before the court. Rather, it means that the court system assures all the individuals who appear before it that they will be judged by the same standards." GORDON, supra note 26, at 3. of potential authority by a judge fully exercising her discretion within such a structure inevitably raises a question of the scope of the court's power. This question, which has been at the heart of every effort to create or reform Family Court, has been posed in a variety of ways. One variation asks whether the role of the Family Court judge is primarily adjudicative or administrative: is her primary purpose to decide specific disputes or to manage the larger, more complex issues that the family brings with it to the courthouse? 2 " A second variation queries: if the court is assuming the larger, managerial role, is that role primarily preventive or primarily remedial? That issue leads to two collateral questions. First, should the court subsume some or all of the services provided to families directly under its control, or should it maintain the traditional division between the executive and judicial functions? 29 Second, if the judge does assume a broader role, does this necessarily include a leadership role for the court in the larger community it serves? 30 While these questions must be incorporated into any discussion of Family Court reform, they confine the analysis to 28. Corbett & King, supra note 26, at 39. After describing the extensive social services available in the Family Court in domestic violence cases, the judges nevertheless conclude: "Our Family Court is being developed as a court utilizing the techniques of the social services, and not as a social service agency utilizing the authority of the law." Id.
Placement of related types of cases under one judicial roof, for greater effectiveness, does not mean that the court should wipe out the legal distinctiveness of each of these matters. . . . Some family court proponents ... . believe that the lines etched in substantive and procedural law interfere with the court's ability to resolve problems and would like the court to have broad freedom, at all stages in its proceedings, to decide what is best for the individual (perceived, necessarily from the viewpoint of the person making that decision).
GORDON, supra note 26, at 2. 29. McDonald, supra note 27, at 7. Family Court has often been characterized as an exception to the bright line demarcation between judicial and administrative roles, and this straddling of roles has been identified, as mentioned above, as one of the inherent tensions of this special court. However the administrative role is defined for the Family Court, it is not without parallels in many state courts which participate in the administration of justice through such actions as regulating the legal profession, establishing regulatory policy or procedural rules, and working on law reform efforts. See Helen Herschkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1833 REv. , 1869 REv. -75 nn. 189-222 (2001 This study has found that the New York City Children's Court, considered by some as an illustration of what a successful court should be, has only begun to move in the expected direction. A minority of children are served with both kindness and skill by those judges, probation officers, and other staff members who have understood the purpose of a children's court, are equipped to perform their tasks 31. "What all this means is that a family court must function as a court, both as a matter of law and as a matter of sound policy. This does not detract from the court's concern for an individual or from its efforts on his/her behalf." GORDON, supra note 26, at 3.
32. See, e.g., Judge Gordon's statement in 1977: "Such a family court will see itself not just as a means of carrying out traditional legal concepts; or as a means of using resources efficiently; or as a means of resolving important individual and societal problems-but as all of these." GORDON, supra note 26, at 5.
33. This question was first posed by Barbara Blum, a member of the New York State Permanent Judicial Commission on Justice for Children during a meeting to determine the direction of the Commission's court improvement agenda in the late 1990s. The question has been kept at the forefront of the Commission's work by Nancy Dubler, another member of the Commission, ever since.
34. ALFRED J. KAHN Kahn's findings confirmed earlier analyses of the juvenile court movement and were repeated by subsequent investigators through the end of the twentieth century. 36 Nevertheless, over its one hundred year history, most critics sought a way to hold on to the idea that a court created to address children's and families' issues had intrinsic value-if they could successfully define that value. 37 Twenty years ago, Edward Mulvey posed a variation of Kahn's lament when he asked whether it was possible to formulate any reasonable goals for a Family Court system that would withstand "later claims of misdirected idealism" and would "provide a more realistic appraisal of the judiciary's role in the regulation of family problems." 3 " Mulvey noted that "considerations regarding the expected effectiveness of the court in regulating family dysfunction have never been adequately resolved," 39 Reform and The California Courts, 1960-1990 , 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2049 L. REv. , 2052 L. REv. (1993 . Reviewing reform efforts for the California court system, Scheiber effectively argued that high volume, congestion, and delay are recurring problems of a court system that will forever be under-resourced. See id. Moreover, procedural reforms, such as judicial reassignments or new forms of case settlement processes, have had limited (and mostly short-term) effects. Id. at 2069-70.
43. There may be myriad reasons why structural change is insufficient. Scheiber highlighted how the local legal "culture" affects the ways in which problems are addressed. Id. at 2053. He also pointed out that the notion that any particular change is a "reform" is misleading: "One person's 'reform' is another's 'reactionary effort at turning back the clock,' and a measure is not an unalloyed good simply because it represents a new approach. Many changes that are routinely called reforms are not truly reformative in any way but rather are better termed 'adjustments.'" Id. at 2055-56. For a parallel discussion of social services reform efforts, see Jane Waldfogel, The New Wave of Service Integration, 71 Soc. SERVICE REV. 463, 465, 479 (1997) (noting that the first administrative reforms incorporating service integration ultimately failed because there was no focus on the substantive core: reforming street-level casework practice).
value-added role and the structure of the model court may create a more lasting synergy for successful reform.
B. The Value-Added Analytical Framework
The analysis I propose for the value-added role of the court begins with a recognition that protecting the procedural due process rights of the litigants in child welfare proceedings while determining the sufficiency of the allegations-and, if the allegations are sufficient, determining custody-no longer adequately defines the role of the Family Court.
While the court will always shoulder these responsibilities, federal and state mandates have incrementally expanded the court's role to the point where the court is now required to determine the sufficiency of the child welfare agency's response to the family's needs prior to, and during, the course of the child welfare proceedings. The court actively oversees the case until a permanent solution has been devised for the child and family-a process that can last many years." This judicial oversight function is different from the role of the child welfare agency, whose primary mission is "to ensure the safety and well-being" of children through the direct provision of assistance. 4 ' If this assistance is effective, the court may never be asked to intervene. If it is not successful and the child welfare agency determines that there is sufficient basis for asking the court to sanction greater intervention and oversight in the parent-child relationship, this secondary intercession by the court (beyond the due process mandates) must have a purpose that transcends the child welfare agency's role. Otherwise, there seems little justification in expanding the court's oversight of the child welfare agency's actions.
The purpose that will justify the court's expanded authority-thus adding value to the family's life-is the rigorous enforcement of the constitutional principles that recognize the importance of children being raised by their families and not by the state. 46 Id.; see also Martin Guggenheim, Minor Rights: The Adolescent Abortion Cases n. 12 (discussing the range of explanations for the primacy of parental control in child rearing) (forthcoming in Hofstra Law Review; on file with author). These legal and philosophical bases for parental authority are reinforced by the psychological analysis of the family as a functioning system. See Mulvey, supra note 25, at 54.
47. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 48. Id. at 65. While Troxel addressed the scope of judicial authority in a private visitation dispute between a fit parent and a third party, in highlighting the constitutional protections afforded parents, the Court expressed clear support for limiting the discretion of courts to substitute their judgment for a parent's. Id. at 57. Acknowledging that the judge would have had greater authority to intervene if there were a question of unfitness, the Court never implied that this intervention would not require the judge to adhere to the family integrity principles. Id.
49. Id. at 66.
50. An example may be illustrative. The court must determine that the child welfare agency used "reasonable efforts" where appropriate to keep a child who is at risk of foster care with her family. 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1) (1994) .
Rigorous enforcement of family integrity principles is likely to result in the court scrutinizing the agency's efforts to maintain the child at home more scrupulously than if the court did not apply these principles.
51. "[Rleasonable efforts shall be made to preserve and reunify families (i) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removing the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA). 5 2 It has also been applied to the states through statute and case law. s3 For the court to fully secure its value-added role by applying the reasonable efforts mandate, it must be willing to use its authority not only to accept jurisdiction over a family, but also to reject that jurisdiction and insist that the child welfare agency either continue its own intervention for the safety of the child and the integrity of the family unit or leave the family alone. 5 4 If the court determines that its jurisdiction is necessary to ensure the child's protection, the court's next obligation is to enforce rigorously its own state's standards for ultimate removal of a child from a parent's care. This includes determining whether that state's requirements for reunification services and planning are being upheld, and maintaining the integrity of the family unit-even when a child is temporarily living outside that family unit-until sufficient facts enable the court to determine that the integrity is no longer viable. Too often, maintaining family integrity consistent with a child's health and safety is not treated as a primary role for the court once a child has been placed outside the family, despite the temporary nature of the placement and the clear requirements of the law. 55 In practice, there is often little more than a cursory review of what has occurred in the interim period between removal and the next court proceeding. 6 In fact, in routinely perfunctory hearings, the court the child's home; and (ii) to make it possible for a child to safely return to the child's home." 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (15) 53. Ramsey, supra note 52, at 26, 29. Ramsey suggested that there may be a constitutional basis for the provision of services before a family is disrupted, because it would be the least intrusive intervention on the state's part; however she acknowledged that the Court has never reconciled least restrictive family intervention with its decisions that the government does not have an affirmative obligation to provide services as articulated in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202-03 (1989) . Ramsey, supra note 52, at 26. In any case, on state law grounds, child protective laws routinely require the provision of services.
54. Such a tiered response parallels Jane Waldfogel's proposal of a "differential response" by child protective authorities in initial child protection investigations. Jane Waldfogel, Protecting Children in the 21st Century, 34 FAM. L.Q. 311, 318 (2000) . Waldfogel recommended differentiating between the most serious cases that require a full-blown investigation and those less serious cases where a more limited service assessment is conducted. Id.
55. In New York, for example, legislative findings and intent state: "To the extent it is consistent with the health and safety of the child . . . the state's first obligation is to help the family with services to prevent its break-up or to reunite it if the child has already left home . 23 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 VERA STUDY] 
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Adding Value to Families 343 expresses dissatisfaction or disappointment with the child welfare agency's efforts to assist the family, but offers little more than admonitions to do better. 57 Neither the primacy of family integrity nor the urgency of achieving stability for a child is accomplished through these inadequate court rituals. On the contrary, by failing to follow through on these mandates during the life of a child welfare proceeding, the court affirmatively harms both the child and the parents." The court fails to provide the impetus for the family and the child welfare system to achieve reunification or, if reunification is unavailable, to obtain alternative stability for the child. 59 That is why the court must (demonstrating that services were discussed in fewer than one-quarter of the cases observed in New York and Bronx Counties). 57. Court orders requiring services to be provided to parents or children in the course of a child welfare proceeding were recorded in thirty-eight percent of the New York County proceedings and thirty-four percent of the Bronx County proceedings. Id. at 24. Moreover, an extension of placement hearing to determine whether a child should remain in foster care, return to her parents, or be freed for adoption, and what actions need to be taken to accomplish the appropriate goal, took on average five minutes in New York County and ten minutes in Bronx County. Id. at 32. New York is not alone in the swift superficiality of its child protective proceedings. As David Herring has demonstrated, judges routinely failed to implement both the letter and the spirit of the AACWA:
Judges would often spend ten minutes assessing a family's progress under the case plan, perhaps adjusting the case plan and determining the placement for the affected child, usually for the next six months. These time constrained hearings did not allow judges to engage in the thorough, comprehensive review contemplated by AACWA. In fact, these hearings did not even allow for an adequate presentation of the evidence and of the parties' positions. What they provided was a chaotic, informal flow of information to the judge .... The result was usually a judicial decision that simply maintained the status quo. In fact, many orders simply read, "child to remain in foster care, review in six months. 58. Despite the aspirations of AACWA, with lax federal compliance mechanisms, children were either left at home in unsafe conditions or languished in foster care; by 1999, 547,000 children were in foster care, more than double the number during the early years of the AACWA. Ramsey, supra note 52, at 30. 59. Herring, supra note 57, at 342. Herring posited that ASFA is not likely to improve the court's compliance with reasonable efforts and other permanency requirements. Id. Without significant increases in resources, a redirection of the resources toward prevention, and audit requirements that analyze the substance rather than the form of compliance:
[the agency and the court will continue to have great difficulty in providing services to troubled families in a timely and effective manner. Under such resource-poor conditions, judges and agency personnel will perceive aggressive permanency planning as something to avoid because public systems deny parents a fair chance to reunify with their children. Id. at 342. affirmatively recognize the assistance that it can provide to the family by consistently enforcing the legal requirements incorporated into this value-added mandate.
FAMILY SYSTEM THEORY AND ITS ROLE IN PRESERVING FAMILY INTEGRITY
"Family system" theory, which recognizes the family as a complex system whose malfunctioning may have multiple causes requiring creative legal dispositions,' 0 reinforces and helps to explain the valueadded role of the Family Court. This psychological theory rejects the medical pathology model of court intervention (i.e., finding the "fault" or "cause" of the family's problem and "fixing it" by court order) as ineffective to accomplish both the social goals of the family and the dual legal goals of the child welfare system to maintain families and keep children safe. 6 ' The family system approach provides a powerful psychological analogy to constitutionally-based family integrity. As Susan Brooks has written:
The current legal system is well equipped to identify an individual child as the subject of child welfare proceedings and to attach blame to an individual parent. Yet, there are obvious flaws with this approach. By focusing on the identified patient [i.e., the child], the system fails to address the needs and interests of other children who remain in the home. Furthermore, by "treating" the parents and patient separately, the legal system fails effectively to facilitate reunification between those parties. Moreover, by singling out the patient, 60. Mulvey characterized this approach as addressing the "family's best interests," though he warned that characterization may be as troublesome as a child's "best interests." Mulvey, supra note 25, at 57. Mulvey noted that a paradigmatic shift must occur from a primarily individualistic focus in order for the legal system to "address the definition and proper place of [the family] interest if it is to adopt a true family focus." Id. at 50. For a more recent and detailed discussion of family system theory in child welfare proceedings, see Susan L. Brooks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Preventive Law in Child Welfare Proceedings: A Family Systems Approach, 5 951, 958 (1999) .
61. Mulvey, supra note 25, at 53. By assuming a distinguishable family disorder with an identifiable cause, the court could be justified in ordering family treatment of that disorder without confronting the issue of family autonomy. In short, a "medical model" has been assumed by many advocates of family courts and the basic logic of this approach supports the judiciary's attempt to isolate the cause of family dysfunction and prescribe an appropriate remedy.
Id. (citations omitted).
that child may be empowered inappropriately in terms of the proper balance of power in the family, which requires parents to have the authority to make important decisions for their children. Most importantly from a family systems approach, the legal system fails to recognize the mutual responsibility of family members in whatever occurs in families. This mutuality is not about blame, but rather how families function, their strengths as well as their areas of weakness. By failing to recognize the importance of the family unit, child welfare law, in both its conception and its operation, undermines families' efforts toward restoration and reunification.
Finally, it neglects a critical component of permanency for children, which is the continuity of relationships with people who are part of their family system, be they biological parents, aunts, grandparents, cousins, neighbors, or close family friends. 2 Applying a family system approach in child welfare proceedings would reinforce the legal application of family integrity unless the judge has sufficient evidence that family unity is no longer consistent with the child's health and safety. Moreover, the family system theory and the legal mandate of family integrity both explicitly reject recent calls for determining the "best interest of the child" prior to a formal court determination of parental unfitness. 63 Rather, the best interests of the child analysis is affirmatively incorporated into family integrity until the court has sufficient factual and legal basis to sever family integrity from the child's best interests. ' This also helps to diminish the false 62. Brooks, supra note 60, at 958. In large part, the belief of legal advocates that utilization of psychological theory will help isolate the underlying cause of family disruption fails to acknowledge a paradigm shift toward interactionism presently occurring in family theory (and in psychology in general). Instead, the predominant legal belief in the value of psychological theory regarding families appears to be rooted in the assumptions of a previous model. Mulvey, supra note 25, at 54-55 (citations omitted). (discussing attempts to establish the best interest of the child standard for court intervention prior to determinations of unfitness).
64. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). While this Court has not yet had occasion to elucidate the nature of a child's liberty interests in preserving established familial or family-like bonds, 491 U.S. at 130 (reserving the question), it seems to me extremely likely that, to the extent parents and families have fundamental liberty interests in preserving such intimate relationships, so, too, do children have these interests, and so, too, must their interests be balanced in the equation.
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346 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW dichotomy between "parental rights" and "children's rights" by seeing both parents and children as part of the legal family unit, even if the child is temporarily out of the parent's custody, until the court affirmatively determines that the parent no longer can legally serve as parent. 65 3. THE BENEFITS OF USING THE VALUE-ADDED ANALYSIS Consistent application of this value-added role of the court will result in multiple benefits for families.
First, it will reduce inappropriate, seemingly benevolent discretion in a system that relies far more heavily than other courts on predominantly individualized, factbased decision-making that lacks a coherent underlying theory of families. 65. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759 (holding that the state may not presume, at factfinding stage of a parental rights termination proceeding, that the interests of the parent and the child diverge). But "family integrity" is not "family best interests." The former still relies on the predominant liberty interests of the parent (with, in some circumstances, the liberty interest of the child) while the latter introduces a third interest of the "family." As Mulvey warned, "whether the state would have constitutional grounds to infer and then to enforce the interests of an abstract, probably nonegalitarian, compact over the individual liberties .of the involved parties presents a thorny issue." Mulvey, supra note 25, at 56-57.
66. Brooks, supra note 60, at 959 ("[Most judges] have no coherent mental health theory guiding their practice ....
A great number of lawyers and judges simply rely on their own sensibilities or 'gut feelings' in child welfare cases."). Troxel presents a good example of this reliance on personal feelings; in explaining his reasoning for granting grandparent visitation, the Washington Superior Court judge below stated, "'I think in most situations a commonsensical approach [is that] it is normally in the best interest of the children to spend quality time with the grandparent' . . . . Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69 (citation omitted). Later the judge added: "I look back at some personal experiences . . . . We always spen [t] as kids a week with one set of grandparents and another set of grandparents, [and] The status quo bias has potentially significant consequences in child welfare decisionmaking. The existence of status quo bias implies a tendency to maintain the current state against changes in either direction, even in a category of cases in which change would be optimal. To the extent that judges in child abuse cases are vulnerable to this bias, they will be inclined to continue an existing custodial arrangement, and they will be inclined to do so in at least some cases in which a custodial change is warranted. 74
Addressing "skew in the assessment of risk," they identified two principal sources of skew:
(1) problems of focus and emphasis, and (2) feedback vulnerabilies. The first includes a bundle of factors in child welfare cases that favor intervention: the very nature of the cases that charge parental maltreatment, the imbalance in resources between the state and the parent affecting the quality of evidence presented to the court, and the judges' greater fear of harm if the child remains at home than if the child enters care. 75 The second, feedback vulnerabilities, magnifies the judge's fear of failure to intervene:
Just as judges are more likely to learn of a regrettable failure to intervene than of a regrettable intervention, they are more likely to receive negative informal and media feedback as a result of a decision to leave a child in an allegedly neglectful or abusive home. In some communities there may be feedback in reaction to family interventions, but the specter of a headline announcing that a child has suffered injury or death as 72. Id. at 147 (observing that influences or biases are identified without "implying improper behavior on the part of the judge [but rather] acknowledge that rule systems are not sufficiently rigid to predetermine all cases and that factors not referenced in the rules will affect decisionmaking in those cases which are not predetermined by the terms of the governing rule system").
73. Id. at 148-50. Status quo bias has been empirically identified in various contexts. Relevant for these purposes is the finding that choice is "motivated less by aversion to loss than by aversion to feeling, being, or seeming to be responsible for a negative outcome ....
[P]eople feel more responsible for their actions than for their omissions." Id. at 149.
Id.
75. Waldfogel also identified risk aversion as a barrier to reforming social service systems, particularly child welfare systems, "where the political costs of making a wrong move are very high." Waldfogel, supra note 43, at 470.
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Adding Value to Families 349 a result of being returned to its parents looms more realistically for most judges and may cause some to deviate from the norm of unskewed decisionmaking. 76
Applying their theory of sequentiality, Davis and Barua found that "interim decisions are more likely to err on the side of intervention" and removal.7 If the unintended effect of sequentiality results in the wrong children being temporarily removed in child welfares cases, the court then has a greater responsibility to assume the value-added role in order to rectify the imbalance created by sequentiality. 7 " Finally, in addition to minimizing state intervention based on factors such as race and poverty and curbing the effects of sequentiality, consistent application of the value-added theory diminishes reliance on a flood of resources into the Family Court system as a prerequisite to fundamental change. 79 Fewer cases will be brought to court, and the 76. Davis & Barua, supra note 69, at 152 (citations omitted). In November 1995, Elisa Izquierdo was killed in New York by her mother. The case received national attention. David Van Biema, Abandoned to Her Fate, TIME, Dec. 11, 1995, at 32 . Following this tragedy, many New York Family Court judges were reluctant to return children to their parents unless they were 100% convinced of the child's safety, fearing the attention they would receive from the media if their decision was not correct. 77. Davis & Barua, supra note 69, at 157. 78. Recognizing the sequentiality effect in some of the most highly contested and publicized child welfare cases reinforces this value-added theory for family court decision-making. This is evident in Boyer and Lubet's discussion of the cases of Baby Richard and Elian Gonzalez, which are both examples of the sequential impact of the court's failure to apply family integrity at initial stages of the proceedings; these cases resulted in protracted custody battles and the children's stability being disrupted. Boyer & Lubet, supra note 63, at 258, 285.
79. Mulvey, supra note 25, at 59 ("One of the striking aspects of family court proposals is the reliance on adequately trained and qualified personnel and resources in order to handle family-based problems in a professional manner."). Given the realities of how courts operate, this is an example of what Sarason terms "the myth of unlimited resources" : Essentially, the general belief-general because of the number of people who hold it and because of the number of social problems which give rise to it-is that by an act of national will or resolve, accompanied of course by appropriately sized expenditures, we can train as many people as are necessary to meet a particular problem . . . . The belief is that by virtue of money one will be able to hire enough people to provide services to eligible people in the best way those services should be rendered ....
I have never cases that are brought will be handled more expeditiously and thoroughly. The potential of this assertion remains difficult for many Family Court practitioners and judges to believe. Without looking at current efforts in New York and elsewhere to reform Family Court, we are unable to assess the potential of a value-added analysis in achieving reform, nor can we determine whether the nature of current reform efforts reinforces or rejects application of the value-added role.
II. NEW YORK FAMILY COURT REFORM
A. Building a Family Justice Program
Since 1997, the New York State Unified Court System has embarked on an ambitious Family Justice Program (FJP) to develop court initiatives and legislative proposals "to address the justice needs of children and families in the New York State Family Court and Supreme Court."" 0 The first and overarching goal of the FJP was to take the final step toward establishing a fully unified Family Court system by creating a Family Division of the New York Supreme Court, the trial court of general jurisdiction in New York. As with other unified court proposals around. the country, the FJP heralded this proposal as the key solution to simplifying the court structure and injecting "common sense" into court practice. 8 ' That "common sense" was a recognition of the overlapping nature of legal problems affecting families and the inefficiencies of having multiple courts address those issues. Establishing a unified court system, unlike the other goals within the FJP, requires a state constitutional amendment that has failed to gain the necessary political support. 8 2 The greatest portion of the FJP, therefore, is designed to be accomplished through administrative, rather than political, action. The known a setting, old or relatively new, which did not complain that it had inadequate numbers to do the job in the way it was conceived best to do Avoiding the problem of limited resources and holding to the belief in a predictable future are among the most potent factors influencing the creation and development of a setting, and their potency is increased in proportion to the extent that they are implicit or unverbalized. SEYMOUR 
FJP begins with an explicit recognition of the uniqueness of Family Court:
The reality is that Family Court-the court that decides society's most difficult issues and has the most profound effect on its litigants' lives-is not like any other court, and the challenge to improve the manner and speed with which it dispenses justice is similarly unique. By their very nature, Family Court cases are not necessarily defined by a single incident or transaction. Its judges are typically faced with an ever-changing scenario of family circumstances-even family members-and a family's legal difficulties are rarely confined to a single docket in a single courthouse. Typical methods of case management ill suit the tangled nature of Family Court affairs, and overwhelming caseloads, inadequate resources and the large numbers of litigants without lawyers only add to the challenge.83 The FJP that has been developed to escape this quagmire grows out of three interrelated strands of judicial reform efforts. The first is the sweeping national "drug court" movement, which generally offers nonviolent, drug-addicted offenders the alternative of court-ordered drug treatment in order to become clean and sober, and to earn dismissal of the criminal charges.8' These courts are considerably less adversarial, focusing more on dispositional results than adjudicating offenses, with the district attorney, defense counsel, judge, and treatment providers working as a team toward the goal of the defendant's sobriety and lawful behavior. 8 The financial and human savings have been substantial, with participants having lower drug usage rates and decreased criminal recidivism and a concomitant savings on incarceration and treatment. 86 The "experimentalist" aspects of the criminal drug court model (e.g., legislative identification of a problem followed by local experimentation with collaboratively-developed and pooled information fueling that experimentation) have been identified as key elements to this methodology for systemic reform. ' New York has been actively 
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WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW pursuing this model, developing more than thirty treatment courts throughout the state. 88 The FJP explicitly acknowledges its intent "to apply the insights gained from these criminal court innovations to the Family Court." 89 The second strand supporting the creation of the FJP is the role of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges (National Council), which has spearheaded an intensive agenda to reform Family Court practice, especially in the area of child welfare.' The National Council's reform efforts have built on changes in federal law that began in earnest with the implementation of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (AACWA) in 1980. 9 ' The AACWA required state child welfare systems to make "reasonable efforts" to prevent children from coming into foster care and to provide services and assistance to children and parents in order to end foster care drift and ensure permanency for children through reunification with their parents or, when appropriate, adoption by another family. ' With this mandate came increasing responsibility by the presiding judge in Family Court to ensure that the "reasonable efforts" at prevention and reunification were actually being made by the child welfare system. 93 Court responsibility shifted from solely finding parents guilty of neglect or abuse and deciding whether to place the children in care, to supervising the provision of services and assistance to the families who appeared in court. ' The National Council spearheaded the effort to encourage judges to embrace this expanded judicial review authority. 95 In addition, the National Council began to advocate for the development of Family Court judges as judicial leaders. Underlying this perspective of 97 Judges who personify this new leader frequently lecture and publish about the effectiveness of this role. 9 They also travel the country, encourage other judges to assume highly visible community roles, speak out on the needs of Family Court to lawmakers, the media, and the public, and assume ever greater administrative oversight of service providers connected to the court. 99 This role harkens back to the earliest days of Family Court when many of the Progressive era reformers believed that a key role for the judge was to be a leader in developing and supervising the provision of community resources to children."l° Not surprisingly, this expansive role has not been uniformly embraced. For many judges whose formative legal training avowed a narrow adjudicatory role, the incremental judicial review requirements of the AACWA, and more recently, the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), are already viewed distrustfully. A greater administrative and managerial role is even more unsettling. 10 '
The final strand is the local convergence of the first two strands in 101. In April 1998, the New York State Permanent Judicial Commission on Justice for Children sponsored a two-day forum for Family Court Judges entitled "Judicial Leadership in Child Welfare." As a member of the Commission and of the forum planning committee, I knew that the forum was intended to reinforce the idea that judges needed to become judicial leaders if significant improvements for children in child welfare proceedings were going to be achieved. During the course of the forum, however, some judges either openly or privately disagreed with the premise that this was an appropriate role for a Family Court judge.
102. E.g., Judith S. Kaye, Making the Case for Hands-On Courts, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 11, 1999, at 13. conjunction with the state courts' research and development arm, the Center for Court Innovation, she has created a wide range of court alternatives-community courts, drug treatment courts, domestic violence courts-to address, through judicial structures, deep seated societal issues which frequently result in court intervention. In relation to Family Court reform, for the last dozen years, Judge Kaye has chaired the New York State Permanent Judicial Commission on Justice for Children (Commission), a quasi-think tank, quasi-action network of statewide leaders grappling with children's issues. 3 The Commission has spearheaded specific efforts, such as the creation of children's centers in courts and the widespread dissemination of information on children's health issues to Family Court personnel, but it has also considered the steps necessary to create lasting reform in Family Court. 104 The Commission embarked on a series of research activities that inspired some of the components of the FJP.' 0 5 Moreover, it has been designated to administer the federally-funded State Court Improvement Project for the court system.' 0 6 Judge Kaye's commitment to Family Court reform also resulted in a resolution adopted by the Conference of Chief Justices that established a Statement of Principles Regarding Children and Families (Statement). 7 The Statement encompassed provisions urging that children and family issues be given high priority within state court systems.' 8 Most compelling, though, was the recognition by the chief justices that "our personal commitment and leadership" is needed to ensure that children and families are best served by the court system."19
These three strands of judicial reform-prototypical drug treatment courts, national Family Court judicial leadership, and a Chief Judge determined to reform Family Court-set the stage for the FJP proposals. Before turning to the specifics of the FJP proposals, it is necessary to review the context in which those proposals were made. Reformers, while always imagining successful systemic change, cannot be successful unless they reflect the complexity of the entity being changed and the barriers to achieving reform. This is true with the Family Court and its component parts as it is with any other complex organization."' What follows is a brief description of child welfare practice in New York City Family Court at the turn of the twentieth century.
B. Current Family Court Practice
In 1999, two years after the initial phase of the FJP was introduced and during the FCTP's second year in existence, 31,973 original child protective petitions and extension of placement child protective petitions were filed in New York City."' While the total number of children in foster care continued its steady decline since the creation in 1996 of the Administration for Children's Services (ACS),"' dipping below 40,000 for the first time in decades, approximately 12,700 children were subject to new child protective or voluntary placement proceedings, which could result in foster care, in 1999.11' Children still remained in foster care for an average of four years, significantly above the national average. 1 4 In thousands of child protective cases heard in Family Court in 1999, no attorney was assigned to represent the parent or other adult respondents in the cases, despite constitutional and statutory mandates requiring indigent parents to be assigned counsel." 1 5 Child protective cases where counsel was assigned took on average 220 days to reach disposition.'
16
Most of the attorneys who represented these parents carried extremely heavy caseloads, frequently juggling over one hundred cases at a time."1 7 Over forty percent of the attorneys spent, on average, fewer than five hours on out-of-court work-such as interviewing and counseling clients, pursuing discovery, preparing for hearings, proposing dispositional alternatives, or negotiating settlements-on cases that 1) Pervasive delay fueled by repeated adjournments without substantive determinations being made; 2) Insufficient compliance with basic norms of professional behavior (e.g., caseworkers being ill prepared or failing to attend court proceedings); 3) Vast amounts of time spent waiting because most cases are scheduled for 9:30 a.m.; 4) Insensitivity to families who have no privacy to consult with caseworkers or attorneys or, even more disturbing, the routine practice of court insiders streaming through the courtroom during proceedings; 5) A woefully inadequate system of representation for parents; 6) An unusually excessive focus on parental behavior and guilt rather than the child's needs and best interests and the family's capacity for reunification; 7) Insufficient attention to risk assessment as a guide to determining the current capacity of parents to care for their children; 8) Insufficient attention to critical legal dictates including the detailed and mandatory AACWA and ASFA reasonable efforts and permanency requirements; and, 9) Judges seeing themselves as powerless victims of the overall system, unable to hold the child welfare system accountable or 118. Id. 255. to ensure justice to children and families, rather than as powerful change agents."' While some of these issues are tied to procedural inefficiencies and insufficient resources, the Marisol Panel was far more concerned with the underlying cultural meaning of these observations. A clear message is sent to families when they are kept waiting all day in overcrowded and inhospitable courthouses only to have their cases adjourned repeatedly because the professionals responsible for these cases are not prepared or present, or because they have ignored the earlier orders of the court. Such circumstances suggest that neither the court nor the other component parts of the child welfare system is committed to achieving stability or permanency for them. These alarming observations were, unfortunately, consistent with multiple recent studies addressing, in part, the role of Family Court in the resolution of child welfare issues."' The Heidt study, for instance, noted the lack of continuity among caseworkers and attorneys in child welfare cases, limited preparation for hearings or exploration of out-ofcourt resources and services, little formal lawyering during hearings, failure to file petitions in a timely manner, frequent and lengthy adjournments, and failure to comply with court orders. 2 5 Delving more deeply into what actually occurs in court, the 1997 Vera Study concluded that in the key area of determining whether agencies are making "reasonable efforts" to prevent or terminate foster care placement and aid in family reunification, scant inquiry into these efforts was made in over half the cases." 6 This study identified reasonable efforts in four categories: family visitation, placement alternatives, 125. Heidt, supra note 124, at 1-2. Heidt's study was based on a state-wide survey of key actors in child welfare cases except for judges; every county but one responded with a seventy-five percent response rate. Id.
126. 1997 VERA STUDY, supra note 56, at 21; see also supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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services, and permanency planning.' 27 In general, there was inquiry into at least one of these factors in fewer than half the cases, and only thirtyeight percent of the judges asked about compliance with their orders and their outcomes.2' In investigating the lack of counsel for parents in Family Court proceedings, the Justice Denied study situated this lack of counsel in the larger iealm of Family Court dysfunction.' 29 As one Family Court judge noted, "if representation is inadequate, then the entire court is inadequate.
The court culture accepts delays, adjournments, and being unprepared . . . . With so few resources, sloppiness is accepted. nI
30
C. The Challenge of FJP Reform Efforts
The problems facing Family Court appear to fall into two categories. The first-and most easily identifiable-encompasses the congestion, delay, and lack of resources that typically compel reform efforts. The second is even more elusive and formidable. What the Marisol Panel and other observers identified was a cultural crisis in the court, exacerbated by the overwhelming numbers, but not necessarily a product of them: the court and its participants seem to have lost their way. Neither legal nor social service mandates are being routinely accomplished in a setting that fails to display sufficient understanding of or sensitivity to the needs and interests of the families being served.' The FJP must be able to address both categories if it is truly a blueprint for systemic reform.
The FJP has seen three phases since 1997 that have included recommendations related to child welfare proceedings. In addition to the general call for a unified court with a family division, Phase I declared that to respond to the "epidemic" in child welfare cases, "the court system is taking the lead through a targeted approach to neglect and abuse," by introducing the idea of "specialized treatment of 127. 1997 
Gordon wrote:
A court can project concern about the individuals coming before it in countless other ways, without sacrificing objective standards in its decisionmaking role. At each point of contact, from the notice that a witness or accused receives, to his/her reception upon entrance to the courthouse, to the waiting rooms, to the timeliness of proceedings, to the procedure followed in the fact finding and any dispositional hearing, to the concern mixed with firmness of any probationary period, and so on, the court can demonstrate respect and concern for each individual involved. GORDON, supra note 26, at 3.
cases." '3 Overall, this specialized treatment was intended to result in more efficient, expeditious and comprehensive adjudication of cases.
1
These goals are reinforced in Phase II, where the change "reaches into the heart of Family Court operations"'34 and "fundamentally changes the way the court conducts its business in order to ensure that the justice needs of children and families are met on a daily basis."
13 For child welfare proceedings, this fundamental change encompassed two strategies. The first-the predominant strategy in Phases I and IIcontinued the traditional court reform paradigm of trying "to reduce backloads and expedite handling of all proceedings" by creating more efficient judicial mechanisms for case resolutions. 36 The second was the introduction of Family Treatment Courts intended "in appropriate cases [to allow] parents [to] receive the treatment necessary for family preservation and unification."' 37 The introduction of Family Treatment Courts heralded a melding of traditional reform mechanisms and something more: an affirmative commitment "to provide coherent, integrated responses to the needs of drug-addicted parents and their children. " 3' This substantive commitment to family unification was reinforced by the methodology chosen to accomplish the goal.
As described earlier, the Family Treatment Court-New York's first model court effort-reflects the basic model court standards created by the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges.' 39 The court started with the premise that the judge assumes an active leadership role to coordinate the creation of the procedures the court will use, to identify and secure the services that will be available to the participants, and to monitor the cases from beginning to end through case conferences and, oftentimes, frequent court appearances. 1 The judge, nevertheless, is part of a case team that includes all of the participants in the system who are working together to determine the goals of the court and the management processes to accomplish those goals. " ' Such team case management recognizes the socio-legal 132. FJP I, supra note 80, at 9. 141. Wolf, supra note 5, at 7. In the case of the treatment court, this included creating the criteria for screening cases for eligibility, determining whether admission to the treatment court would require waiving certain due process rights, and having court
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complexity of family crises, the inability of traditional adversarial processes alone to address continuing family dynamics, and the need for multi-disciplinary problem solving approaches. 42 At the same time, all of the participants have to assess their professional ethical obligations to determine how their clients might be affected by participation in a model court that has different requirements than the rest of the court system.' 43
These requirements include early and active intervention by the court, access to and acceptance of appropriate services, and continuous monitoring by the case management team led by the presiding judge.'" The inclusion of the Family Treatment Courts and the other model courts in the FJP introduced a potentially more radical approach to reform through their substantive commitment to the family and their procedural mechanisms to achieve the goals of the value-added role I earlier defined for the court. FJP Phase III expanded the use of these model courts and others, such as dedicated domestic violence parts throughout the state.' 45 Preliminary data suggests that some of the New York model courts contain the kernels for systemic reform. 4 ' What personnel take on some of the case management duties usually performed by child welfare agency personnel. Id.
142. Weinstein, supra note 69. 143. Wolf, supra note 5, at 11. The treatment court was created while I was Attorney-in-Charge of the Juvenile Rights Division of the Legal Aid Society (JRD), which represents children in most of the child welfare cases in New York City. Extensive discussions were held at JRD about the role of the child's lawyer in a treatment part that minimizes the adversarial process and requires parents and children to waive certain procedural rights. Participants also worried about developing the skills for new methods of problem-solving, such as case conferencing or mediation, that model courts embrace.
144. Intensive and early intervention is intended to capitalize on the family crisis that precipitated agency and then court action by, in essence, acting before it is too late. This is in marked contrast to the lack of supervision by the court in the studies discussed supra notes 119-30 and accompanying text. 145. FJP III, supra note 83, at i-iv. 146. In the New York County Model Court in 1999, four times as many child protective cases reached disposition within ninety days as compared to the regular child protective court parts. Sara P. Schechter, Family Court Case Conferencing and PostDispositional Tracking: Tools for Achieving Justice for Parents in the Child Welfare System, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 428 n.4 (2001) . By the end of six months, the Model Part had reached disposition in almost 93% of its cases while only 38.4% of the rest of the county's child protective cases had reached disposition. Id. at 428. There were some other significant outcomes differences as well during that year: 46% of children were placed compared to 58% in the rest of the child protective parts, id. at 430 n.8; 24% of the cases were either dismissed, withdrawn, or adjourned in contemplation of dismissal compared to 13%, id. at 430 n.10; and the median stay in foster care was only 4.6 months in 1999 compared to the twenty-seven month length of stay calculated in 1998 for the rest of New York City. Id. at 430. Nevertheless, the number of children released to their parents or other relatives was almost identical in the Model Court and the rest of the child protective court parts. Id. at 430 n.9. For data from the In compiling this information, the model courts have provided Family Court judges and practitioners nationwide with valuable information about their intentions, their efforts to realize those intentions, and their reflections on those efforts. 50 Given the range of jurisdictions serving as model courts, no jurisdiction can simply dismiss the lessons of the model courts as irrelevant because of demographics. On the contrary, the similarities that many of the model courts experience, provide useful information, regardless of their demographics.
By willingly discussing what have been labeled "stumbling blocks" to accomplishments on the court web sites, the model courts have acknowledged the complexity and difficulty inherent in any reform effort. Equally important for an analysis of whether the model courts have value-added potential is what the model courts choose to identify as their substantive goals and the impact of those choices.
The model courts initiative is described by its funder, OJJDP, as "a nationwide effort to improve how courts handle child abuse and neglect cases, [that] is helping children spend less time in foster care and resulting in earlier resolution of cases in dependency courts." 5 ' The model courts are part of the larger effort by the NCJFCJ/PPCD "to educate judges and other practitioners on the need to expedite secure safe permanent placements for all maltreated children, either by making it possible for them to safely stay with or return to their own families or by finding them safe adoptive homes." 52 The model court description also includes other key elements seen as essential for success: interdisciplinary training and technical assistance for all youth-serving professionals using the NCJFCJ's Resource Guidelines as a blueprint for improving court practice; identifying "lead" judges to mobilize all the relevant players within their jurisdictions; developing programs that can be seen as easily replicable in other jurisdictions; piloting innovative alternative dispute resolution methods; and sharing information locally and nationwide through enhanced data systems.' 53 A number of issues are immediately apparent when the profiles of the model courts are reviewed. 150. Whether the court has actually done what it says it meant to do and/or achieved its intentions cannot be analyzed through its words alone, but requires qualitative analysis.
151. MENTABERRY, supra note 140, at 1. 152. Id. This description of the model courts is fully consistent with the valueadded role for Family Court as it clearly incorporates the basic belief in family integrity into its core.
153. Id.
emphasis on procedural goals that address administrative and judicial efficiency. Third is the paucity of discussion by many of the model courts around substantive goals in general and, in particular, goals that reinforce the value-added role of Family Court that is so clearly present in the blueprint Resource Guidelines that every model court is using."
Each model web site contains sections on lessons learned and advice to other courts. Many of the findings in these sections are so consistent from court to court that they provide the best overall framework for analyzing each court's difficult experience in managing change.
Most of the courts recognized that full cooperation, collaboration, and communication among all the stakeholders in the family court and child welfare systems are essential change elements. This requires every part of the system to work together to identify issues, share information, and try solutions. For systems that have rarely made these efforts, patience for outlasting resistance to change then becomes a crucial component. 171. Chicago, Illinois: "To protect every child's right to a safe, permanent, nurturing home and to strengthen families in crisis, treating all with dignity, respecting diversity, and valuing each child as our own." Id. at 51. San Jose, California: "To protect children, preserve families and provide permanency for children while treating all with dignity, respecting diversity, and valuing each child as our own." Id. at 169.
172. For example, Chicago, Illinois, explicitly identifies on-site availability of services as providing "the family with the optimum chance for reunification where appropriate." Id. at 54. San Jose's creation of a drug court developed, in part, out of the recognition that substance abuse services were not available for mothers with their children. Id. at 171. Given that the efforts of Cincinnati, Ohio's Hamilton County Juvenile Court occurred much earlier, I am not including that model court in a comparative discussion. See Hardin, supra note 44.
173. El Paso, Texas: "Although family group conferencing was originally developed as a diversion strategy, the El Paso Model Court intends to expand the concept to reunify families as part of a plan to strengthen family structures after legal case closures." 1999 STATUS REPORT, supra note 155, at 76.
174. Miami, Florida: "The Model Court team reaffirmed success as providing permanency on a timely basis, and acknowledged that permanency is not always reunification and that sometimes-despite skilled social work intervention and legal representation-parents are unable to resume their parental role." Id. at 106. 175. Reno, Nevada: "The Family Drug Court Program utilizes a strength-based approach in helping families develop and strengthen the skills necessary to develop responsible, drug-free and alcohol-free homes for their children." Id. at 151.
for reunification.' 76 Tucson, Arizona, came to a similar conclusion about family visitation practices and developed significantly improved and expanded visitation policies for families.' 77 Nevertheless, identifying family integrity as a core substantive goal remains an emergent process for these courts. 
C. Aiming for Lasting Reform: The Necessity of Getting to Substance
While there is no question that all of the model courts have struggled valiantly to improve the court system for the families they serve and that for some of the courts the highlighted, detailed procedural reforms have had and will continue to have important substantive results, it is disturbing that so few of the courts discuss their substantive goals, other than adoption, more explicitly or at all. The paucity of discussion about family integrity-in the form of preventing children entering care or seeking their swift reunification with their families if possible-is especially disturbing. Not only does it conflict with the constitutional and statutory mandates described in Part I above, but it is also in direct contradiction to the key principles underlying the Resource Guidelines that form the blueprint for the model courts. While always assuring a child's safety first, these principles list "avoiding unnecessary separation of children and families," and "reunification" as the first two principles." 2 Only when these unification principles cannot be achieved do the guidelines address the principle of developing alternative permanency plans.' 83 Because many of the model courts have not focused on substantive goals that are consistent with the mandates of family integrity highlighted in the Resource Guidelines, the probability that model courts will create sustainable reform is severely jeopardized.
First, as discussed in Part I, reforms constructed only around administrative or procedural goals have had a history of limited success. The remarkable potential of the model court movement should not be limited by the primacy of efficiency or administrative restructuring, nor considered possible only with additional resources or reduced caseloads.'S4 Second, if Family Court is going to create more significant, sustainable reform, it must rigorously apply the substantive goals that form the basic construction of the model court movement. Those goals capture the value-added potential for Family Court that reformers have previously other. The court was becoming the place where important decisions were being made by everyone involved in the case.
182. RESOURCE GUIDELINES, supra note 93, at 12-13. 183. Id. For discussion on the purpose of the entire model court project, see supra note 151-53 and accompanying text.
184. The Marisol Panel specifically highlighted the difference between the cultural climate of the New York County Model Court and the FCTP and the cultural climate of the rest of the New York City Family Court. While the Panel acknowledged that the reduced caseloads and additional staffing were responsible for some of the difference, they credited the altered tone of the proceedings-supportive, concerned, and inquisitive-as being far more important to the overall success of the model courts. ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 76, at 48-49.
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WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW found so elusive. The model court structure and process form a prototype to achieve success through the dynamic interaction of adherence to the substantive goals in a setting conducive to their achievement. That dynamic interaction is apparent in some of the initial accomplishments of the New York County Model Court." 5 New York County piloted a Special Expedited Permanency Part (Special Part) in 1999 and 2000.186 In a recent article, Judge Sara P. Schechter recounts both her experience as the presiding judge of the Special Part and as a participant in a two-day conference on "Achieving Justice: Parents and the Child Welfare System," to highlight what she believes have been some of the most effective outcomes of the Special Part.' 87 She begins with a litany of the complaints by parents about their experiences in Family Court expressed during the conference:
As panelists and members of working groups, parents who had been respondents in Family Court reported a number of problems in the course of having their cases reviewed: they did not understand what was going on during the court proceedings; their lawyers never talked to them or explained the nature of the proceedings; they were never given an opportunity to talk in court or tell their side of the "story"; they were never consulted with respect to the formulation of the service plans for their families; and they had to spend inordinate amounts of time waiting for their cases to be called into court and had to return to court many times after repeated adjournments. Few parents perceived the court process as having contributed to the reunification of their families. At best, the court was seen as a rubber stamp for the child welfare agencies and, at worst, as an independent obstacle and source of delay. 8 Schechter then outlines how creating a model court that begins permanency planning at the beginning of the court process-on the day the case is filed in court-and focuses on conferencing and monitoring throughout the life of the case resulted in increased respect and welfare agency and the court to participate actively in seeking solutions and minimize the tendency to have only the professionals providing information or negotiating solutions.' The results look nothing like the current Family Court paradigm. First, distance between the participants and the professionals is diminished.
Closer personal contact decreases the tendency to stereotype cases and families. Rather, the complexity of the individuals and families involved is more obvious. The opportunity to see a family as more than the subject of a child protective proceeding can result in more nuanced decision-making, building on family strengths as well as addressing the factors that resulted in harm to the child. Over time, understanding and respect can be developed. 2 ' Second, the model court becomes the site where families and service providers have a consistent place to meet and share information. 1 The court personnel, including the judge, can be appreciated as relevant participants in the life of the case rather than solely as taskmasters or interlopers, mucking up decisions or arrangements made during extensive periods of time when the court had nothing to do with the case. The judge, in turn, can make determinations based on more information and less speculation. Third, the process of extensive and consistent monitoring-which utilizes current information to modify services and assistance-diminishes the effects of sequentiality.°"
The judge is able to measure the consequences of her decisions within a short period of time and thus alter them if they prove inadequate or wrong. Structuring outcomes that can build on small steps, taken in short periods of time, enables the judge to measure capacity for increased responsibility on the part of parents and other family or community supports. The biases that traditionally result in a greater likelihood of removal of children from parental care will be countered by more information about the family, more opportunity to modify or undo custodial decisions, and heightened awareness of the consequences of the decisions.
If the mandates of family integrity are applied by judges in the context of model court processes that utilize these informational and monitoring mechanisms, three levels of court intervention will emerge that can ultimately be used in all child welfare proceedings. The first and most radical under current practice, is the court's determination that its authority is unnecessary to protect the child or assist the family. While the court has always had the authority to dismiss a case, the
